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Abstract. Proof-of-Ownership (PoW) can be an eective deduplication
technique to reduce storage requirements, by providing cloud storage
servers the capability to guarantee that clients only upload and down-
load les that they are in possession of. In this paper, we propose an
attribute symmetric encryption PoW scheme (ase-PoW) for hierarchi-
cal environments such as corporations, in which (1) the external cloud
service provider is honest-but-curious and (2) there is a exible access
control in place to ensure only users with the right privilege can access
sensitive les. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst such scheme
and it is built upon the ce-PoW scheme of Gonzalez-Manzano and Or-
la (2015). ase-PoW outperforms ce-PoW in that it does not suer from
content-guessing attacks, it reduces client storage needs and computa-
tional workload.
Key words: Deduplication technique, Proof of Ownership, Symmetric
encryption, Access control
1 Introduction
Cloud storage services are increasingly popular with both individual and orga-
nizational users1. This is, perhaps, unsurprising due to the wide range of cloud
storage solutions oering signicant or unlimited amount of storage to individual
users and organizations such as educational institutions [1, 2]. Cloud storage has
also attracted the attention of researchers [3] such as forensics [4, 5, 6], security
and privacy [7, 8, 9], in addition to designing ecient and eective storage so-
lutions. For example, deduplication techniques have been the subject of recent
research focus due to their potential in signicant reduction of cloud storage re-
quirements. Specically, the deployment of deduplication techniques allows cloud
1 http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Time-to-outsource-data-storage and
http://www.lima.co.uk/blog/3-reasons-why-businesses-choose-to-outsource-their-
data-storage/; last accessed 10 May 2016
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servers to store only a single copy of the uploaded data together with the list of
owners, thus, signicantly reducing the storage requirements [10].
There are two main security challenges faced in deploying deduplication tech-
niques in a hierarchical context, namely le access control and data leakage pre-
vention. In the former, it is critical to ensure that only authorized users are
granted access to the le. Let us consider a naive deduplication scheme, where a
client sends a le identier to the cloud and if it is already stored, then the server
assumes that the client owns the le. However, this allows an attacker (including
another malicious client) who only knows a le identier but does not have the
le to gain access to the le (e.g. by \colluding" with the le owner such as
compromising the device of the le owner using malware). Proof of Ownership
(PoW) scheme has been shown to be a viable solution against such an attack.
PoW schemes, rst introduced by Halevi et al. [11], guarantee that clients are
in possession of the uploaded les, by presenting a proof of le ownership that
can only be established when the le is available to the clients. Under a secu-
rity parameter, a PoW is assumed to be secure even when an adversary knows
part of the le [12]. Several PoW schemes extending the work of Halevi et al
have been proposed in the literature. For example, Di Pietro et al. [12] propose
the s-PoW scheme designed to enhance client-side eciency, Blasco et al. [13]
present the bf-PoW scheme designed to achieve exibility and scalability, and
Gonzalez-Manzano et al. [14] propose the ce-PoW scheme designed to deal with
honest-but-curious servers and to achieve eciency. In a hierarchical deployment,
deduplication also needs to ensure that users have rights to access the data and a
number of proposals have been presented in this regard [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Such requirement is also referred to as authorized deduplication [19]. However,
existing proposals generally impose a signicant burden on the cloud server or
do not necessarily ensure that users own the le.
In the data leakage prevention scenario, given that data storage is outsourced,
cloud servers are assumed to be honest-but-curious. Such servers honestly exe-
cute the proposed scheme but they may attempt to learn the stored content. To
mitigate such threats, previous attempts have focused on encrypting the les.
We observe that current solutions generally use symmetric encryption, due to
the need to ensure that the result of the encryption of a same le remains the
same in order to allow deduplication. The most common approach is to apply
the Convergent Encryption (CE) scheme [16], where les are encrypted using
their content as a key [22]. However, CE suers from a number of limitations
including content guessing attacks (i.e. malicious clients are able to discover the
plaintext content) [16, 14]. There is no known PoW solution that provides both
le access control and data leakage prevention. This is the gap that this paper
seeks to contribute to.
We present the Attribute Symmetric Encryption Proof of Ownership scheme
(hereafter referred to as ase-PoW), which extends the ce-PoW scheme presented
in [14]. Specically, we include a lightweight access control procedure that does
not impose any burden on the cloud server and our proposed scheme is designed
to withstand content guessing attacks. To ensure that the scheme can be deployed
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in a hierarchical application, access control is achieved through encryption where
the keys are linked to user attributes. Thus, only users with a given attribute
(say belonging to a particular department, e.g. human resources) can access (and
further deduplicate) the corresponding le (e.g. employees' contracts). We then
demonstrate that ase-PoW outperforms ce-PoW, in terms of both storage and
client eciency.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the ce-PoW scheme.
Section 3 describes the proposed scheme ase-PoW. We demonstrate the security
and utility of the proposed scheme in Sections 4 and 5. Related work is discussed
in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines future research
directions.
2 Revisiting the ce-PoW scheme
The ce-PoW scheme [14] is an ecient PoW scheme designed for an environment
involving honest-but-curious servers. In the scheme, les are encrypted using
Convergent Encryption (CE) where the encryption key is the le itself, and
proof of ownership is achieved by requesting from clients some CE-encrypted
chunks. Specically, let H1 : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gn and H2 : f0; 1gB ! f0; 1gl
cryptographic hash functions, where B and l represent the chunk size and the
token size respectively; and n is a positive integer. There are two phases in the
ce-PoW scheme, namely:
{ Initialization: The client sends the le size to the server, which responds
with the number of chunks the le should be split into. Then, the client con-
vergently encrypts each chunk, computes H2 over each encrypted chunk and
nally, computes H1 over the resulting hashes obtaining hc. Both hc and the
encrypted chunks are then sent to the server. The server will compute hc from
the received encrypted chunks and verify whether the computed result is the
same as the received data to avoid poisoning attacks. If the verication re-
turns true, then the server creates an array storing three structures, namely:
one structure to store the list of owners, one structure to maintain a list of
challenges, and another one to store the responses to the challenges.
{ Challenge: The server receives a hc value. If hc entry is not found, then
the server requests the client to upload the le size; thus, reverting to the
initialization phase. If an entry for hc exists, then the server loads in memory
the rst unused challenge together with the corresponding responses, prior to
sending the challenge to the \claiming" client. The client then computes the
response token for each of the J chunk indices and sends the array of response
tokens to the server. Subsequently, the server checks whether the received
tokens match the stored tokens. If the check returns true, then the server
labels the PoW as successful and assigns the le to the client. Otherwise, the
client is considered to have failed the PoW.
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This scheme is proven to be secure under the bounded leakage setting, in
which a limited portion of a le may be leaked (i.e. 64MB) but the le owner is
able to prove the possession of such a le in a secure manner [11].
However, the ce-PoW scheme suers from two main weaknesses.
1. Due to the use of convergent encryption, the scheme is vulnerable to the
inherent content-guessing attacks.
2. Due to the need to store decryption keys (i.e. chunk hashes) on the client
devices in order to decrypt downloaded les, the number of keys stored by
any client corresponds to the le size for les smaller than 64MB and 5% of
the le size for les larger than 64MB. This is an unrealistic requirement,
particularly for client devices such as smart phones.
3 Attribute Symmetric Encryption Proof of Ownership
Scheme
In this section, we present an overview of the system, the threat model and the
goals of the proposed scheme, prior to describing the scheme.
3.1 System overview
To explain how ase-PoW can be implemented in practice, let us consider the
following use case.
Use case. A University consists of Departments (Di) divided into Groups
(Gi), which work in dierent Projects (Pi). Members of a given Gi may work
in dierent Pi. In addition, each Pi has a Gi who is the designated leader.
Users involved in Di, Gi and Pi have their own attributes and thus, they have
corresponding keys.
For simplicity, we now assume that there are two departments, D1 and D2
(Figure 1). The former is composed by G1 and G2, which manage a pair of
projects, P1 and P2. G1 and G2 are leaders of P1 and P2 respectively. In D2,
there is only one group, G3, which is the leader of P3. Moreover, G1 takes part
in P2 and G2 is involved in P3.
In terms of managing les f1 and f2 of P3, there are two main steps, namely:
encryption and deduplication. For encryption, let us assume that f1 needs to be
accessible only to users involved in P3 whereas f2 can only be accessed by G2
members working on P3. Thus, f1 is symmetrically encrypted with KP3 while f2
is also symmetrically encrypted with Kf2 which is created encrypting KG2 with
KP3 .
For deduplication, we will now focus our discussion on f1. At rst, one of
the users involved in P3 uploads f1 after encryption, together with its digest hc
(recall Section 2). It must be noted that hc is used by the server to identify f1
in subsequent uploads. Then, the server prepares three data structures, namely
one to store the list of owners, another to keep a list of challenges, and the third
for their expected responses. Thus, at the time other client tries to upload f1,
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Fig. 1. An example use case
the server requests a set of challenges. If such challenges are provided as per
specication, it is assumed that f1 is owned by this client and the client will be
added to the list of owners.
3.2 Entities
In ase-PoW, three entities are identied. First, the client is the entity that holds
the le to be deduplicated. Each client is a user of a hierarchical organizations,
i.e. a corporation, that belongs to one or more of its areas, i.e. departments. He
performs the PoW to the storage server, which is in charge of keeping all les.
For each le, the server manages data structures that contain the identities of
clients which are allowed to access to the le and the challenges to be satised
in the PoW, as it will be explained later. Apart from the client and the server
an Attribute Certicate Service (ACS) is introduced. It is responsible for
managing which users belong to each department over time. As such, ACS grants
or revokes the permission to access to condential les, once a user joins or leaves
an area.
3.3 Threat model
The adversary is assumed to be an attacker who attempts to download a le he
does not possess, via the following means:
{ Content-guessing attack where attackers intercept interchanged PoW chal-
lenges and try to guess their content.
{ Collusion attack in which the legitimate le owner colludes with a malicious
client (an adversary ~C) leaking part of the le content. In [14], a PoW scheme
works on the assumption that the exchange of information is not interactively
performed along the PoW challenge, in addition to the assumption that 64MB
is suciently large to discourage collusion [11].
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f1 : managed by all members of P3 
f2 : managed by G2 members 
working on P 3 
Cloud 
3.4 Goals
A total of six goals are considered in this proposal. The rst three goals focus
on security, namely: goals one and two capture the scenario where an adversary
seeking to download a le he does not own, and the third goal deals with ac-
cess control. The remaining set of goals capture the performance requirements,
namely: minimizing bandwidth, memory consumption and storage space. Specif-
ically, the goals of this proposal are as follows:
Security: an adversary ~C, who does not possess a complete le f , has a negli-
gible advantage in succeeding in a PoW given a security parameter .
Collusion resistance: an adversary ~C, who does not possess a complete le f ,
must exchange a minimum amount Smin of information with the legitimate
owner of f to be successful in the PoW. According to Halevi et al. [11] Smin
is set to 64MB.
Simple ne-grained access control: the encryption, apart from providing
condentiality, should allow the management of access control without in-
volving the cloud server in the access control management process and with-
out requiring the involvement of additional tasks for the client and the server.
Besides, it should be as ne-grained as possible, thus allowing the specica-
tion of dierent encryption policies.
Bandwidth eciency: the number of exchanged bytes between client and
server along a PoW execution should be minimized.
Server space eciency: in a PoW, the server should load in memory a small
piece of information independent of the input le size.
Client space eciency: regardless of the use of cryptography, clients have to
store as few keys as possible. In addition, the number of stored keys should
be independent of le sizes.
3.5 The Proposed Scheme
The scheme builds on the scheme presented in [14], and the key dierences are
the use of symmetric encryption on the chunks and the enforcement of access
control.
To carry out cryptographic computations, ase-PoW leverages on the hierar-
chical structure of organizations as well as the existence of ACS. In particular,
belonging to each organizational unit (say Department or Group) or working
on a given Project implies that each user holds an attribute. Each attribute is
linked to a key provided by ACS. Thus, when a user requests the attestation of
attributes, ACS veries such attributes and provides keys accordingly.
In this scheme, there are two phases { see Figure 2. In the Initialization
phase, the client rstly requests keys to ACS and symmetric keys are delivered
when the client possesses the right attributes. Then, the client requests the
upload of a le sending the digest of the encrypted le hc to the server. Once the
server veries the le is not already stored (hc not stored), the client sends the
le size and the server provides the amount of chunks the le should be split into.
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Client Server ACS 
1. t ist of attributes l att · att · ... att l 
1. h 
3 . File not stored 
4. File size off 
G 
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11. h 
15. res 
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t) h, not stored: fi le requested 
p 8 . Compute 
token(i)=H,{E,f[il) 
h', =H1(token) 
h', =h,? p 9 . If h',;h, ; A is computed e lse abort 
-A(h',J.ENC= encrypted chunks, ENC[i] 
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positions each. 
-A[h',J.RES = expected response tokens to 
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-·· 
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select challenge for/ 
send array pos w ith J positions 
p 16. For i in (0, J-1) 
(res[i), A[hJRES(*,iJ)? 
Fig. 2. ase-PoW description. 
:J 
The client symmetrically encrypts ea.ch file chunk applying keys provided by ACS 
(Algorithm 1). In case multiple keys are at stake, each chunk is symmetrically 
encrypted with a key (Ks) - Such key is formed by a recursive encryption of the 
set of keys that are found in the path from Ji to the highest group of corporate 
members that need access to it. T hus, let a and b the levels in which Ji and 
the said group are located, respectively. T he encryption key is then formed by 
Ks=EKJ .. (EKb 1 (Kb))) . Note that if a = b, then no recursive encryption is 
needed since the file is already accessible to the smallest group of members. After 
encryption, each encrypted chunk of file J is denoted as EKsJ [i]. In last place, 
the encrypted file is sent to the server which initializes an array A where he 
is the lookup key - A [he].ENC contains encrypted file chunks, A [he].CH stores 
10,000 challenges (with J random positions each), A [he].RES keeps the expected 
response tokens that correspond to the challenges and A [he].AL contains a list 
of identifiers of clients who own J (Algorithm 2) . 
In the C h a lle nge phase, when a stored file is requested because he sent by 
the client matches with the one stored in the server, the client encrypts requested 
file chunks and performs a digest 1£2 over it until complete the requested chal-
lenge (Algorithm 3) . As aforementioned, the encryption may involve creating Ks 
2. Attributes 
verification 
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Algorithm 1: First client upload at client side
Input: Number of chunks N , a le f and encryption key(s) Kj in the
encryption order f1;...;jg
Output: Hash hc of the symmetrically encrypted le chunks; and symmetric
encrypted chunks EKjf [i] or EKj (:::(EK1f [i]))
for i 0 to N   1 do
token[i] [H2(EKN f [i]) or H2(EKj (:::(EK1f [i])))];
end
hc H1(token);
return hc and EKjf [i] or EKj (:::(EK1f [i]));
Algorithm 2: First client upload in ase-PoW. Server side (analogous to
ce-PoW [14] except for the encryption procedure)
Input: Encrypted chunks ENC[i] = EKSf [i] and hc uploaded by client C.
Output: The entry A[hc]
for i 0 to N   1 do
Compute array token from received ENC[i]
token[i] H2(ENC[i]);
end
hc  H1(token);
if :Match(hc;H1(token)) then
return ?;
end
Store 10,000 random challenges CH with J indexes each
for x 0 to 9999 do
for y 0 to J   1 do
pos[y] PRF (seed);CH[x; y] pos[y];RES[x; y] token[pos[y]];
end
end
A[hc]:ENC  ENC;A[hc]:CH CH;A[hc]:RES RES;A[hc]:AL
fid(C)g;
return A[hc];
recursively. Finally, the PoW will be passed or not according to the verication
the server performs comparing the received responses (res) with the stored ones
(A[hc]:RES) (Algorithm 4).
4 Security Analysis
We now demonstrate that the ase-PoW scheme achieves the rst three goals
described in Section 3.4, and the remaining goals will be addressed in Section 5.
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Algorithm 3: Challenge phase at client side
Input: A le f , an array pos of J indexes and encryption key(s) Kj in the
encryption order f1;...;jg
Output: An array res of J response tokens
for i 0 to J   1 do
res[i] [H2(EKjf [i]) or H2(EKj (:::(EK1f [i])))];
end
return res;
Algorithm 4: Challenge phase in ase-PoW. Server side. (Analogous to
ce-PoW [14])
Input: hc of a le f ; two arrays pos and res of J indexes and client response
tokens, respectively
Output: The outcome of the challenge
for i 0 to J   1 do
if :Match(res[i];A[hc]:RES[; i])) then
return ?;
end
end
A[hc]:AL A[hc]:ALSfid(C)g;
return >;
4.1 Security
The security analysis of ase-PoW is based on ce-PoW [14] and builds on the
earlier proofs of Di Pietro et al. [12] and Blasco et al. [13]. The adversary is
challenged on J independent chunk positions where the probability of success is:
P (succ) = P (toki)
J = (p+ 0:5l(1  p))J ; (1)
where p is the probability that a malicious client ~C knows part of the le; thus,
able to perform a collusion or a content guessing attack.
From Eq. 1, a lowerbound for J is derived which ensures P (succ)  2, where 
is the security parameter, as
J   ln 2
(1  p)(1  (0:5l)) (2)
In this regard, the rst goal of ase-PoW, security, is satised when Equation 2
holds under parameter . Moreover, the second requirement, collusion resistance
involves ensuring that a legitimate client C does not exchange Smin bytes with
a malicious client ~C to allow the malicious client to run a successful PoW for an
unknown le. Considering that chunks are managed, there are FB tokens in a le
f of size F of chunks of size B, the token length l can be set as:
l  SminB
F
(3)
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The third security goal, simple access control, is also achieved. Access control
is enforced by the fact that the ownership of attributes becomes a key to access
les. Just an ACS is introduced to deliver keys once attributes are attested and
it does not have any active role in the deduplication process. In addition, ne
grained access control is achieved due to the use of recursive encryptions. They
can be compared with the encryption of les with attributes (keys) concatenated
with AND operators, meaning that dierent encryption policies can be applied.
Apart from the previous issues, ase-PoW tackles the content-guessing attack.
In contrast to [12] and [13] which do not apply encryption and to [14] which ap-
plies CE, a symmetric encryption scheme is applied herein. It ensures encrypted
chunks are independent of les entropy, thus preventing this attack. Indeed, even
if les were obtained by attackers they could not be decrypted.
4.2 Complexity
We now evaluate the complexity of ase-PoW with that of Di Pietro et al. [12],
Blasco et al. [13] and Gonzalez-Manzano et al. [14]. In particular, the evaluations
(see Table 1) focus on client and server computation and I/O, server memory
usage, bandwidth, and number of used keys (if required).
We remark that ase-PoW complexity diers from ce-PoW in a critical aspect,
namely: the number of keys managed by the client. Particularly, in ase-PoW,
client computation involves a symmetric encryption scheme based on a chosen
number of recursive encryptions (nre) in relation to owned attributes. As a result,
the client only needs to manage up to nre keys, regardless of the number of les
under deduplication. In ce-PoW, the client needs to store all chunk hashes of
every le deduplicated, as these hashes are the le-specic decryption key. This
may be up to 5% the le size, e.g. 50MB for 1GB les. Thus, ase-PoW reduces
the storage space needed in the client to allow deduplication.
The comparisons between ase-PoW and s-PoW and bf-PoW are similar to
those with ce-PoW. It is clear that client and server computations involve less
complexity in s-PoW and bf-PoW than in the other schemes, since there is
no encryption involved. The bandwidth requirement is also noticeably lower
in s-PoW and bf-PoW, as in ase-PoW and ce-PoW J tokens are sent to the
server. However, neither s-Pow nor bf-PoW protect against honest-but-curious
servers. Thus, striking a balance between security and eciency is expected. The
remaining set of features can be considered similar among all studied schemes.
5 Performance Evaluation
We now present the ndings of our evaluations, based on the settings described
in [14]. Specically, ase-PoW is evaluated against bf-PoW [13] and ce-PoW [14].
We did not evaluate our proposal against s-PoW [12] because it has been shown
that ce-PoW outperforms s-PoW.
All schemes were implemented in C++ using OpenSSL as a cryptographic
library. AES in counter mode and SHA-1 are the two main operations. As in
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Table 1. Complexity comparative summary. Applied symbols are taken from Section
4
s-PoW [12] bf-PoW [13] ce-PoW ase-PoW [14]
Client computation O(F )  hash O(F )  hash O(B)  CE  hash  hash O(B)  Sym:  nre  hash
Client I/O O(F ) O(F ) O(F ) O(F )
Server init computation O(F )  hash O(F )  hash O(B)  hash  hash O(B)  hash
Server regular computation O(n  )  PRF O

l  (log1=pf )
pf

 hash O(n  l  )  PRNG O(n  l  )  PRNG
Server init I/O O(F ) O(F ) O(F ) O(F )
Server regular I/O O(n  ) O(0) O(0) O(0)
Server memory usage O(n  ) O

log(1=pf )
l

O(n  l  ) O(n  l  )
Bandwidth O() O

l 
pf

O(l  ) O(l  )
# stored keys - - up to 5% le size j att j
[14], H1 and H2 are based on SHA-1 being H2 applied over encrypted chunks
extending the length of the hash to l through the use of the stream cipher RC4.
To ensure a fair evaluation, we used the parameters dened in [13, 14],
namely: the security parameter is set to =66; Smin=64MB, the size of to-
kens (l) is set to f16, 64, 256,1024g bytes, the probability (p) that an adversary
knows a chunk of a le is set to f0.3; 0.5; 0.75; 0.95g and that key size is 256B.
According to these values and Equation 2, the number of requested challenges
(J) corresponds to f65, 91, 182, 914g. Similarly, considering the said values of l,
Smin and the input le size, the size of chunks (B) is according to Equation 3 {
see Table 2.
Table 2. Chunk sizes (B) in bytes, computed from the le size, the token size and
Smin
File size (MB)
l(B) 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048
16 16 16 16 16 16 32 64 128 256 512
64 64 64 64 64 64 128 256 512 1024 2048
256 256 256 256 256 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 1024 2048 4096 8192 16384 32768
The experiments were performed on a AMD Athlon(tm) II x2 220 processor
with 4GB of RAM. Input les were randomly generated and their sizes ranged
from 4MB to 2GB doubling the size at each step.
The client side computation is studied in the following section. Server side
computation of ase-PoW is similar to that of ce-PoW since the server tasks
remain unaltered. Then, server side computation in ase-PoW (and ce-PoW) is
comparable with that of bf-PoW (see [14]).
On the client side, the most relevant issue to consider is the time taken (in
clock cycles units) to compute challenges. First of all, the time taken to create
the chunk encryption key were computed, resulting in 12262 clock cycles when
there were 7 keys (6 recursive encryptions) and 18743 clock cycles when there
were 11 keys (10 recursive encryptions). These values are considered negligible
relative to the remaining part of the scheme. Then, to present a worst case
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Fig. 3. Client response creation clock cycles for J=f65,91,182,914g challenges and 11
keys.
analysis, the computation of challenges considering 11 keys was studied. Results
are depicted in Figure 3. We concluded that:
{ The time remains constant regardless of the number of requested challenges,
namely for J=65 and J=91. As expected, the time increases when more chal-
lenges are computed, specially for J=914.
{ The time also remains constant regardless of the le and chunk size when
l <64B. In case of higher l, e.g. l=1024B, the time increases between les of
512MB and 2 GB but it is just particularly noticeable for J=914, and to a
lesser extent for J=182.
Figure 4 describes the evaluation ndings of bf-PoW, ce-PoW and ase-PoW
when there were 11 keys, and it is clear that bf-PoW has the best performance.
This is because in bf-PoW, a token is computed for each J chunk index through
a hash function. However, performance of bf-PoW is comparable with ase-PoW
for l=1024b and bf-PoW does not protect against honest-but-curious servers. On
the other hand, ase-PoW outperforms ce-Pow in all cases. In ce-PoW, a hash per
encrypted chunk is computed which increases the computation time. By contrast,
ase-PoW symmetrically encrypts chunks and though the chunk encryption key
may involve several recursive encryptions, ndings demonstrate that the time to
compute this key is negligible in comparison with the rest of the process.
6 Related Work
Deduplication, such as PoW schemes, has been the subject of research focus
[23, 11, 12, 13, 14]. For example, the PoW schemes in [24, 25, 26, 15, 17, 27]
are designed to work with honest-but-curious servers. Due to the use of CE in
many existing PoW schemes such as [25, 26, 16, 17, 22], these schemes are not
secure against content analysis attacks as previously discussed [16]. A number
of proposals to avoid such pitfalls has also been proposed in recent years. For
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Fig. 4. Client response creation clock cycles for J=f65,91,182,914g challenges and 11
keys.
example, in [27], les are asymmetrically encrypted and decryption keys are
interchanged among clients. The proposed approach in [24] involves an identity
provider designed to prevent sybil attacks, and an indexing server to prevent
data leakage.
The signicant amount of data managed by cloud servers necessitates the
implementation of access control solutions, as this will allow servers the capabil-
ity to determine whether a requesting client has the appropriate access rights.
Attribute based encryption (ABE) is one commonly used method to achieve ne
grained access control in the cloud [28, 29, 30, 31], where les are encrypted
under a set of attributes and decrypted by a key with the right attribute policy
[28]. However, deduplication is not considered in these works which is unsurpris-
ingly since ABE is a non-deterministic encryption scheme and therefore, cannot
be applied to this context.
Table 3 compares the proposed ase-PoW scheme and other similar dedupli-
cation and access control schemes, based on the use of a PoW scheme, security
against honest-but-curious servers, involvement of third parties, theoretical se-
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curity analysis, search of bandwidth, server and client side space eciency, and
empirical performance analysis.
Table 3. Comparative summary
PoW Honest-but- Third Theoretical Bandwidth Server Client Empirical
Proposals scheme curious servers parties security analysis eciency space eciency space eciency analysis
[15]
p
Not specied. Intermediator - - - - -
Public keys used
[16] - Metadata manager, - - - -
p
additional server
[17] [21]
p Message-lock Key server - p - - p
encrypt
[19]
p Convergent Private - - - - -
encryption cloud
[20] - Convergent Multiple - - - -
p
encryption servers
[18] - Convergent Distributed - - - -
p
encryption key server
[32]
p
- Auditor
p
- - - -
ase-PoW
p
Symmetric Attribute
p p p p p
encryption certication server
*: mentioned but not applied
It is clear that access control and deduplication require additional entities
and additional management tasks. In [16], for example, a metadata manager
enforces key management and handles deduplication. In [17, 21], there exists a
key server per group of clients which is in charge of key management and helps
in the deduplication process. In [20], the Dekey scheme shares encryption keys
among clients via distributed key servers. The SecDep scheme in [18] involves
multiple key servers, which are also tasked with deduplication. In [32], an auditor
veries the integrity of data in the cloud.
There are only a small number of proposals using a PoW scheme while man-
aging deduplication and access control [15, 17, 21, 19]. Although [15, 17, 21]
mention the use of PoW, no concrete details are provided. In [19], an interme-
diator becomes the PoW verier.
[32] appears to be the only work that provides a security analysis and no
other studies examine server and client space eciency. With the exception of
[15], key storage is externalized to additional servers, relieving clients from the
burden of managing and storing keys. Bandwidth eciency is considered only
in [17, 21], and just some schemes do an empirical analysis [16, 17, 21, 20, 18].
In summary, it is clear that achieving both eective and secure PoW and ac-
cess control management for deduplication in the presence of honest-but-curious
servers is an understudied topic.
7 Conclusion
Cloud storage is a trend that is unlikely to go away anytime soon, and one
of the key challenges is to reduce storage requirements. Deduplication schemes
are a viable solution, and in this paper, we present the Attribute Symmetric
Encryption Proof of Ownership (ase-PoW) scheme. The scheme is based on
recursively and symmetrically encrypting le chunks to prove the possession of
14
les. We demonstrate the security of the scheme, as well as the utility of the
scheme using empirical analysis. Specically, we show that ase-PoW is ecient
and has better performance compared with similar schemes in the literature
(e.g. outperforms ce-PoW, and ase-PoW has the benet of having a constant
computation time for le types when l <64B).
Future work includes enhancing access control expressiveness, and combining
deduplication and Proof of Works [33] and Remote Data Possession Checking [34]
in an environment with untrusted cloud servers. Moreover, simple ne-grained
access control is achieved in this work but the development of a more complex
access control management scheme, e.g. [30], is the following step.
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